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11 Introduction
Experience garnered over many years has taught antitrust authorities in the United
States (US) and the European Union (EU) that companies which have been colluding
in one speciﬁc product or geographic market are more likely to have engaged in cartel
activities in other adjacent markets.
Due to the high diversity of businesses in multinational ﬁrms, cartel activities bear
all the marks of contagion between and especially within companies. The probably most
well-known example for such a cross-linked collusive pattern is the conspiracy in the
markets for various vitamins. The striking feature of this complex of infringements was
the central role played by Hoﬀmann-la Roche (HLR) and BASF, the two main vitamin
producers, over the course of ten years in virtually every cartel aﬀecting the whole ex-
tent of bulk vitamin production.1 HLR, BASF and Rhˆ one-Poulenc instigated the ﬁrst
main group of cartels which consisted of price ﬁxing agreements in the markets for vi-
tamins A and E. The initial success of these arrangements inspired their replication in
other vitamin markets. Smaller producers such as Merck, Takeda and Daiichi joined
the pioneers and simultaneously colluded in a number of vitamin products. Accordingly,
the European Commission (EC) stated that “the simultaneous existence of the collusive
arrangements in the various vitamins was not a spontaneous or haphazard development,
but was conceived and directed by the same persons at the most senior levels of the com-
panies concerned”.2 Rhˆ one-Poulenc’s disclosure of evidence on collusion in the markets
for vitamins A and E led to the opening of an investigation. However, only BASF’s com-
prehensive collaboration with the US Department of Justice (DoJ) under the Amnesty
Plus Program accelerated inquiries and ﬁnally led to the successful prosecution of all
participants. When Rhˆ one-Poulenc plead guilty to its vitamin conspiracies under the
US Amnesty Program and applied for leniency under the 1996 EC Leniency Notice, it
did not provide any information on its participation in the vitamin D3 infringement
and even pursued cartel activities in other product markets such as methionine and
methylglucamine.3
In the US, convictions of global cartels in the 1990s suggest that at least a dozen ﬁrms
were repeat oﬀenders in related product industries (Connor, 2003). The DoJ has been
investigating around 50 alleged international cartels in 2004, and half of them have been
detected during inquiries on other markets (Hammond, 2004). With the objective of
1Concerned were the markets for vitamins A, E, B1, B2, B5, B6, folic acid, C, D3, H, beta carotene
and carotinoids.
2EC IP/01/1625 November 2001.
3EC IP/01/1625 November 2001, EC IP/02/976 July 2002, EC IP/02/1746 November 2002.
2fully exploiting the multimarket contact between colluding ﬁrms, the DoJ implemented
the Amnesty Plus Program in 1999 as part of its Corporate Leniency Policy. According
to Hammond, “The Division’s Amnesty Plus program creates an attractive inducement
for encouraging companies who are already under investigation to report the full extent
of their antitrust crimes [...]” (Hammond, 2004, p.16).
Leniency programs reduce ﬁnes for cartel members that bring evidence to the an-
titrust authority. Amnesty refers to the complete exemption from ﬁnes. Amnesty Plus
aims at attracting amnesty applications by encouraging subjects of ongoing investiga-
tions to consider whether they qualify for amnesty in other than the currently inspected
markets where they engage in cartel activities. In particular, Amnesty Plus oﬀers a
ﬁrm, which currently plea-bargains an agreement for participation in one cartel, where
it cannot obtain guaranteed amnesty, complete immunity in a second cartel aﬀecting
another market. Provided that the ﬁrm agrees to fully cooperate in the investigation of
the conspiracy of which the DoJ was previously not aware, it is automatically granted
amnesty for this second oﬀense. Moreover, the company beneﬁts from a substantial
additional discount4, i.e. the Plus, in the calculation of its ﬁne in any plea agreement
for the initial matter under investigation.5
Under the current EC Leniency Notice, Amnesty Plus does not exist. Although, in
2001, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recom-
mended the inclusion of Amnesty Plus as part of the 2002 reforms of the EU Leniency
Program, the EC did not seize the opportunity to follow the US example by introducing
a similar policy.
The present paper studies whether and how the Amnesty Plus policy aﬀects ﬁrms’
incentives to form a cartel.6 It seems intuitive that, following a conviction of one cartel,
Amnesty Plus encourages ﬁrms to report another cartel by granting the ﬁrst ﬁrm which
applies for this program a substantial discount in the ﬁne already imposed. However,
we argue that, Amnesty Plus may have important consequences for cartel formation
4The size of the additional discount mainly depends on three factors: The strength of the evidence
provided by the cooperating company, the potential signiﬁcance of the revealed case measured in terms
of volume of commerce involved, geographic scope and the number of co-conspirators, and the likelihood
that the DoJ would have detected the cartel absent self-reporting (Hammond, 2006).
5As a counterpart of Amnesty Plus, the DoJ contemporaneously implemented the Penalty Plus Pro-
gram. Penalty Plus increases the ﬁnes for companies that neglect to take advantage of Amnesty Plus
but are nevertheless caught for a second time. The main reason why we do not include Penalty Plus in
our analysis is that, whereas we want to focus on the diﬀerence between the US and the EU amnesty
policy, the clause of “aggravating circumstances” in the “2006 EC Guidelines on the method of setting
ﬁnes” is very similar to the US Penalty Plus.
6In particular, we examine the possible eﬀect of Amnesty Plus on the best collusive subgame-perfect
equilibrium that can be sustained through standard trigger strategies.
3in particular because it increases the ﬁrms’ incentives to report a cartel after a ﬁrst
detection.
We study two markets in which two identical ﬁrms play an inﬁnitely repeated game
of collusion. In each period, the ﬁrms can choose to form a cartel before interacting
on the product market. Collusion generates incriminating evidence which the antitrust
authority can discover with some probability. In addition, each ﬁrm can also bring this
evidence to the authority. When a cartel is detected, either through an investigation or
a ﬁrm’s self-reporting, each cartel member, except the ﬁrst reporting ﬁrm, has to pay a
ﬁne. Amnesty Plus becomes relevant when the ﬁrms have to decide whether to report a
cartel in one market after they have already been convicted in the other market.
Our main result is that Amnesty Plus may aﬀect cartel formation in two diﬀerent
ways: On the one hand, Amnesty Plus may have a pro-competitive eﬀect by dissuading
the ﬁrms to create one of their cartels when they would have formed both of them in
the absence of Amnesty Plus. On the other hand, Amnesty Plus may also have an
anticompetitive eﬀect as it may encourage the ﬁrms to form both cartels when they
would have formed only one of them under an antitrust policy without Amnesty Plus.
We also examine whether the ﬁrms can exploit their multimarket contact by linking
punishment strategies across markets. Without Amnesty Plus, the ﬁrms can always treat
the markets in isolation and thus, they use multimarket trigger strategies only if this
facilitates collusion. Amnesty Plus however inherently links the markets. Moreover, it is
the antitrust authority which decides on the implementation of Amnesty Plus, and the
ﬁrms can only try to weaken its eﬀectiveness by adapting their strategies. In particular,
we ﬁnd that if the markets do not diﬀer substantially in terms of proﬁtability, the use
of multimarket strategies, while it does not directly aﬀect the ﬁrms’ ability to collude,
lowers the pro-competitive eﬀect of Amnesty Plus and increases its anticompetitive eﬀect.
Surprisingly, although legal studies which mainly argue in favor of an Amnesty Plus
policy in Europe are burgeoning, the existing literature contains virtually no formal
economic analysis which attemps to clarify possible motives for the EC’s non-adoption
of Amnesty Plus, let alone to study the potential impact of such a policy on cartel
formation. We take the ﬁrst step towards ﬁlling this gap in the economic theory on
leniency programs.
Recent academic research such as Harrington (2008), Chen and Rey (2007), Aubert
et al. (2006), Spagnolo (2004) and Motta and Polo (2003) has elaborated on the dif-
ferences in conception of leniency programs and their impact on the eﬀectiveness of
antitrust enforcement.7 This line of research mainly highlights the basic trade-oﬀs be-
7For an extensive overview of the economic literature on leniency programs see Spagnolo (2006).
4tween destabilizing collusion and deterring cartel formation and explores whether and,
if so, under which conditions, leniency programs do not deter but rather encourage the
formation of a cartel. The results are embedded in a normative analysis of how the an-
titrust authority should design such programs to minimize their undesirable eﬀect. Our
analysis is close in purpose to this literature in that we examine how Amnesty Plus as
a feature of leniency programs aﬀects cartel stability. However, unlike in previous work,
where the ﬁrms collude in one market only, we allow them to simultaneously participate
in two collusive agreements.
Some studies suggest that leniency programs which not only reduce ﬁnes but oﬀer
a positive reward to whistleblowing ﬁrms can deter collusion in a more eﬀective way.
In particular, Aubert et al. (2006) ﬁnd the minimal reward necessary to induce a ﬁrm
to report collusion and point out that this reward may be quite large. Spagnolo (2004)
shows that an optimally designed leniency program rewards the ﬁrst reporting company
with an amount equal to the sum of the ﬁnes paid by its former partners. On this
issue, economic theory however conﬂicts with legal practice. Although granting posi-
tive rewards may strengthen the deterrence power of leniency programs, remunerating
antitrust oﬀenders not only raises moral concerns but may also increase the risk of neg-
ative eﬀects in that it may further lower the expected penalty level. Hence, antitrust
authorities mostly refrain from rewarding informants.8 However, it may be argued that
Amnesty Plus is equivalent to granting more than 100% leniency because it not only
waives the entire penalty in the second cartel but also gives a ﬁne discount for the initial
infringement (Wils, 2007). From this perspective, the justiﬁcation for an Amnesty Plus
policy does not seem obvious.
Another strand of literature studies the role of multimarket contact between ﬁrms in
sustaining collusion when monitoring is perfect. In their seminal paper, Bernheim and
Whinston (1990) build on the idea, ﬁrst raised by Edwards (1955) and further devel-
oped in a ﬁnite oligopoly games context by Harrington (1987), that multimarket contact
across ﬁrms may foster anticompetitive outcomes. As a benchmark, they establish an
irrelevance result: with identical ﬁrms and markets and constant returns to scale tech-
nology, multimarket contact does not aﬀect the opportunities for cooperation. However,
they also identify various plausible circumstances in which strategically linking markets
facilitates collusion by slackening the incentive constraints that limit the ﬁrms’ ability to
sustain collusive behavior in settings of repeated interactions. Spagnolo (1999) refutes
8Note however that for other forms of multiagent crime, like government fraud, the US False Claim
Act substantially rewards the cooperation of individual informants. Moreover, Korea has introduced a
reward scheme for reporting parties in antitrust cases. However, the rewards still seem much too small
to compensate for the social and economic costs whistleblowers are likely to incur.
5this irrelevance result and shows that, if the ﬁrms’ static objective functions are strictly
concave, multimarket contact always makes collusion viable in a set of markets even if,
in its absence, it could not be sustained in any of these markets.
Relatively few papers examine the eﬀect on collusive behavior of the interaction
between multimarket contact and imperfect information. Thomas and Willig (2006) ﬁnd
that exploiting multimarket contact by strategically linking markets may be unproﬁtable.
This surprising result occurs because strategic linkage may promote contagion which
allows adverse shocks to spread from one market to another. Matsushima (2001) shows
that eﬃcient collusion can be achieved in the limit through the linkage of a suﬃciently
large number of identical markets.
We look at the interaction between Amnesty Plus and multimarket contact and its
eﬀect on the ﬁrms’ ability to collude when information is perfect. Our analysis allows
to distinguish the anticompetitive eﬀect of strategic linkage from the one of Amnesty
Plus. Whereas multimarket strategies are chosen by the ﬁrms and used only if they are
pro-collusive, Amnesty Plus is implemented by the antitrust authority. Hence, it links
markets both when it facilitates but also when it hinders collusion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model.
Sections 3 and 4 analyze cartel formation when ﬁrms use standard trigger strategies
both under a European antitrust policy without Amnesty Plus and under a US antitrust
policy with Amnesty Plus. In section 5, we graphically present our main ﬁndings. In
sections 6 and 7, we allow ﬁrms to use multimarket punishment. Section 8 brieﬂy
concludes. All proofs can be found in appendix A. In appendix B, we discuss how the
relaxation of two important assumptions aﬀects our results.
2 The Model
2.1 Set-up
We consider two markets k = 1,2 in which two identical ﬁrms play an inﬁnitely repeated
game where, in each period, they can choose to form a cartel before interacting on the
product market. Communication is necessary for collusion and generates hard evidence
which makes it possible to establish the antitrust oﬀense. Markets 1 and 2 may diﬀer in
proﬁtability. In particular, market 1 is at least as proﬁtable as market 2. Firms discount
future payoﬀs by a common discount factor δ ∈ [0,1]. We compare the ﬁrms’ cartel
formation decisions under the EC Leniency Program and the US Amnesty Program
whose sole diﬀerence here is that the latter allows for Amnesty Plus. Amnesty Plus
6signiﬁes that a ﬁrm which has been caught colluding in one market can get a discount
in the ﬁne already imposed by reporting the remaining cartel in the other market.
The collusive joint proﬁt is 2πk > 0, and thus, each ﬁrm makes a cartel proﬁt equal
to πk. Denote by λ = π2
π1 ∈ ]0,1] the proﬁt ratio of the two cartels. If ﬁrms compete,
they make zero proﬁts. In case one ﬁrm unilaterally deviates from the cartel while the
other continues to collude, the deviating ﬁrm earns the whole short-term cartel proﬁt
2πk alone, whereas the other ﬁrm gets nothing. Firms use (grim) trigger strategies. The
punishment ﬁrms agreed upon starts the period following the deviation and lasts forever
after.
At the time ﬁrms decide whether to enter an illegal agreement, they observe the
strictness of the enforcement policy that is summarized by a conviction probability q ∈
]0,1] with which the Antitrust Authority (AA) opens an investigation in one market
leading to the conviction of the colluding ﬁrms with certainty.9 Detection across markets
is independent. Each convicted ﬁrm pays a market speciﬁc ﬁne Fk which is reduced under
Amnesty Plus to Fk − Rk in return for the disclosure of the second cartel. Rk ∈ ]0,Fk]
represents the ﬁne reduction granted to the ﬁrst informant. The higher Rk the more
generous the Amnesty Plus policy. The ﬁrm which is eligible for Amnesty Plus is the
ﬁrst company which reports the second infringement and thus, it also receives amnesty
in that market. If both ﬁrms simultaneously apply for Amnesty Plus, each is ﬁrst with
probability 1
2.
To keep the analysis simple, we assume that the evidence of collusion lasts for only
one period. Thus, even after a ﬁrm has deviated from a collusive agreement it is held
liable for its cartel behavior and can be ﬁned until the end of the period in which the
deviation occurred.10 Each cartel member has the possibility to bring the incriminating
evidence to the AA. The ﬁrst informant is eligible for total immunity from ﬁnes under a
standard Amnesty Program. In our model, the only strategic implication of this standard
Amnesty Program is that, since a defecting ﬁrm must still fear conviction, a unilateral
deviation is always immediately followed by the reporting of the cartel.
In practice, ﬁnes are set according to judicial principles but are often related, directly
9To keep the model simple, we identify investigation and conviction with a single probability. However,
we could introduce uncertainty with respect to the AA’s ability to prove guilty a detected cartel by
substituting qs for q where s is the probability with which the investigation succeeds. See Chen and Rey
(2007) for an analysis of optimal leniency rates before any and once an investigation is opened which
distinguishes the probability of launching the investigation from the probability with which it succeeds.
10The limitation period of the liability for antitrust oﬀenses is generally a positive number of years.
Article 25 of the EC Council Regulation 1/2003 states that the Commission can sue for Administrative
Action until ﬁve years from the date of the infringement. Moreover, “[...]in the case of continuing or
repeated infringements, time shall begin to run on the day on which the infringement ceases”.
7or indirectly, to the nature and importance of the anticompetitive behavior, and thus,
to the proﬁts from collusion. We assume that the AA sets the ﬁne as a function of the
per period collusive proﬁts11, Fk = F(πk) where F(·) is an increasing function. Let then
θk = Fk
πk denote the ﬁne-proﬁt ratio for market k = 1,2 and suppose that θ2 ≥ θ1. This
reﬂects the idea that the ﬁne rises proportionally or less than proportionally with the
cartel proﬁt, i.e. that θk = Fk
πk is weakly decreasing in πk.12 Fine records tend to support
this assumption.13
Following a cartel conviction, we assume that the AA closely monitors the previously
collusive industry and thus, ﬁrms compete and never return back to collusion in the same
market.
2.2 Timing
The time structure of the game is as follows:
• t = 0:
Stage 0: Both ﬁrms decide in each market whether to enter a collusive agreement.
If at least one ﬁrm decides not to collude in market k, competition takes place in
this market. If this happens in both markets, the game ends for that period. If
both ﬁrms choose to collude in market k, their communication leaves some hard
evidence.
Stage 1: Each ﬁrm decides whether to deviate or not from the collusive agree-
ment(s). Its rival does not observe this decision until the end of stage 2.
Stage 2: Each ﬁrm decides whether to report the evidence to the AA. The AA
detects the cartel with probability 1 if at least one ﬁrm self-reports. The ﬁrst
informant gets complete immunity from ﬁnes in this market, whereas the other
ﬁrm has to pay the full ﬁne. If each cartel formed in stage 0 is reported in this
stage, the game ends for this period; otherwise:
11Since the evidence that incriminates a cartel lasts only for one period, the assumption that the AA
takes the collusive proﬁt per period and not cumulated over the whole duration of the cartel as a basis
for the determination of the ﬁne seems plausible.
12E.g., let F(·) be an increasing concave function or let Fk be an aﬃne transformation of πk: F(πk) =
a+bπk with a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0. In Appendix B.1, we discuss how the relaxation of the assumption θ2 ≥ θ1
aﬀects our analysis.
13E.g. Vitamin cartel: In the US, a ﬁne equal to 127% of the collusive overcharge was imposed in the
market of vitamin B2 whereas it ranged between 63% and 88% of the collusive overcharge in the more
proﬁtable vitamin C market. In the EU, the ﬁnes ranged between 63% and 88% for vitamin B2 and
between 30% and 60% for vitamin C (Connor, 2005).
8Stage 3: Each cartel formed in stage 0 and not reported in stage 2 is detected with
probability q. If the AA does not detect the cartel(s) formed in stage 0, the game
ends for that period. If the AA however detects the cartel(s) formed in stage 0, the
colluding ﬁrms pay the corresponding ﬁnes, and the game ends for that period. If
the ﬁrms have formed both cartels in stage 0, and the AA has detected only one
of them, then:
Stage 4: Each ﬁrm chooses whether to report the remaining cartel.
• t ≥ 1: If both cartels have been formed but none of them has been convicted
(detected or reported) in the previous period, the same time structure applies to
this period. If either no cartel has been formed or the cartel(s) formed has (have)
been convicted, the ﬁrms compete in both markets.14 If either one cartel has been
formed and not convicted or both cartels have been formed but only one cartel has
been convicted, then:
Stage 0: Each ﬁrm decides whether to enter a collusive agreement in the market
where the cartel has gone undetected in the previous periods. If at least one ﬁrm
chooses not to collude, competition takes place in this market, and the game ends
for this period.
Stage 1: Each ﬁrm decides whether to deviate from the collusive agreement. Its
rival does not observe this decision until the end of stage 2.
Stage 2: Each ﬁrm decides whether to report the evidence to the AA.
Stage 3: The AA detects the cartel in market k with probability q. If the cartel
is not detected the game ends for this period. If it is detected, the colluding ﬁrms
pay the corresponding ﬁnes.
2.3 Individual Stability of a Cartel
We ﬁrst examine under what conditions an individual cartel is sustainable if the ﬁrms
interact in only one market k. The ﬁrms can try to sustain repeated collusion by using
trigger strategies in which they would return to competition the period following the
deviation in case one of them deviates from the collusive outcome. In the presence of
a standard amnesty policy where the ﬁrst self-reporting ﬁrm pays no ﬁne, deviating
14We assume here that the ﬁrms can only form a cartel if this cartel has already been formed in the
previous period. In Appendix B.2, we relax this assumption and discuss the strategy where the ﬁrms
form cartel 1 until it is detected and then form cartel 2.
9and reporting weakly dominates deviating and not reporting. A unilateral deviation
is therefore always followed by an amnesty application. Hence, in the period of the
deviation, the informant earns the whole cartel proﬁt and pays no ﬁne whereas thereafter,
he gets zero proﬁts from competition. Collusion is sustainable if the present discounted
value Vk of the cartel is at least as big as the gain each ﬁrm gets from a unilateral
deviation in this market, that is
Vk ≥ 2πk
Vk is the continuation value of the cartel in market k and is such that:
Vk = q(πk − Fk) + (1 − q)(πk + δVk)
Solving for Vk yields
Vk =
πk − qFk
1 − δ(1 − q)
The above condition deﬁnes an individual stability threshold such that cartel k is








A ﬁrm has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from the collusive equilibrium if δ ≥
e δ(q,θk). Both ﬁrms anticipate that collusion will be sustainable and thus, they form
the cartel. However, if δ < e δ(q,θk), the ﬁrms anticipate that, immediately after the
formation of the cartel, they would both deviate and self-report. Hence, they do not
form the cartel in the ﬁrst place. The individual stability threshold is increasing and
continuous in all its arguments. Intuitively, the higher the probability of conviction and
the higher the ﬁne-proﬁt ratio, the more ﬁrms have to value future ﬂows of collusive
proﬁts, and thus, the higher the δ needed to individually sustain the cartel. Note that
e δ(q,θk) ≤ 1 if and only if θk ≤ 1
q − 2. Otherwise, the cartel k is individually unstable
for any value δ ∈ [0,1]. Finally, the assumption θ2 ≥ θ1 implies that e δ(q,θ1) ≤ e δ(q,θ2),
i.e. a cartel in market 2 is equally or more diﬃcult to sustain than a cartel in the more
proﬁtable market 1.
103 EC Leniency Program With Standard Trigger Strategies
Suppose now that the ﬁrms encounter each other in the two markets 1 and 2, and that
they use standard trigger strategies to sustain collusion. Each ﬁrm plays the collusive
equilibrium in market k = 1,2 as long as the partner colludes in this market. If a ﬁrm
unilaterally deviates from the collusive agreement, the other ﬁrm competes from the
next period on and forever after in this market. Note that a deviation in one market
triggers punishment only in this speciﬁc market. Intuitively, since punishment strategies
as well as detection probabilities across markets are independent, ﬁrms treat each market
in isolation, and their actions in market 1 do not inﬂuence their decisions in market 2.
The condition under which a cartel is formed is therefore the same as the condition
under which the cartel is individually stable. We provide a formal proof of this intuitive
argument and state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under the EU antitrust policy, a cartel is formed if and only if it is
individually stable. More precisely,
i/ If δ < e δ(q,θ1), no cartel is formed.
ii/ If e δ(q,θ1) ≤ δ < e δ(q,θ2), cartel 1 is formed whereas cartel 2 is not.
iii/ If e δ(q,θ2) ≤ δ, both cartels are formed.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In what follows, we assume that θ2 ≤ 1
q − 2. Without this assumption, the region in
case iii/ where the ﬁrms form both cartels would be empty.
4 US Amnesty Program With Standard Trigger Strategies
We now introduce an Amnesty Plus policy which allows a ﬁrm, already caught in one
cartel, to beneﬁt from a ﬁne reduction if it is the ﬁrst to report the other cartel. It
has been heavily advertised that the main beneﬁt of Amnesty Plus is its eﬀect on cartel
desistance: Amnesty Plus increases the ﬁrms’ incentives to report a cartel after the
detection of another cartel. However, we argue that, above all, Amnesty Plus may
have important consequences for cartel deterrence in particular because it encourages
reporting after a ﬁrst detection. To see these eﬀects, we proceed by backward induction.
Suppose that the ﬁrms have formed both cartels, and the AA has detected one of them,
say cartel −k. The remaining cartel k survives this detection only if none of the ﬁrms
11unveils the collusive evidence to the AA at the end of this period. The ﬁrms do not
report cartel k if and only if two conditions jointly hold. First, the ﬁne reduction a ﬁrm
gets in return for the disclosure of cartel k must not exceed the discounted value of this
cartel. That is
δVk ≥ R−k
This condition deﬁnes a robustness threshold such that cartel k is robust to the













Note that the robustness threshold is increasing and continuous in all its arguments. In
particular, it increases with the ﬁne reduction R−k. The more generous the Amnesty Plus
policy, the higher the robustness threshold, and the more the ﬁrms ﬁnd the reporting
of cartel k attractive. Hence, Amnesty Plus encourages ﬁrms to report a cartel once
another cartel has been detected. Second, the ﬁrms will have to again form cartel k at
the beginning of the next period. This will happen if and only if the individual stability
condition holds. Hence, cartel k survives the detection of cartel −k if and only if it is







If this inequality does not hold, the ﬁrms report cartel k. In particular, if cartel k is
individually unstable, the ﬁrms anticipate that they cannot form this cartel next period.
Reporting cartel k is then a dominant strategy for each ﬁrm. If a ﬁrm anticipates
that its partner does not report cartel k, it gets a strictly positive ﬁne reduction from
reporting instead of zero from not reporting. Moreover, if a ﬁrm anticipates that its co-
conspirator reports, it also prefers reporting since it gets Amnesty Plus with probability
1
2 and avoids paying a ﬁne with certainty. If cartel k is individually stable but not
robust, the Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies is to report this cartel. Again, if a
ﬁrm anticipates that its partner reports cartel k, it also prefers to report. However, even
if a ﬁrm anticipates that its partner does not report and thus that they may form the
cartel again next period, it prefers to report because the ﬁne reduction is higher than
the present discounted value the ﬁrm would get from sustaining this cartel.
Let us compare the individual stability to the robustness threshold in market k. We
12ﬁnd that










Intuitively, if the ﬁne reduction R−k is rather small, Amnesty Plus cannot induce the
reporting of the cartel, and it is the individual stability and not the robustness condition
which is stringent. Hence, cartel k survives the detection of cartel −k if and only if
δ ≥ e δ(q,θk). However, if the ﬁne reduction is large enough, the ﬁrms want to beneﬁt
from Amnesty Plus and therefore they report the cartel. In this case, it is the robustness
condition which is stringent, and cartel k survives the detection of cartel −k if and only







Since we can now determine the outcome in the last stage of the game after a possible
detection in one of the markets, we examine the ﬁrms’ decisions in the cartel formation
stage. The ﬁrms create both cartels only if they do not ﬁnd the optimal unilateral
deviation proﬁtable. Hence, the joint formation of the cartels is a Nash Equilibrium if
the expected present discounted value each ﬁrm gets when forming both cartels is weakly
higher than the payoﬀ from the optimal unilateral deviation, that is
V12 ≥ payoﬀ from the optimal unilateral deviation
This inequality deﬁnes a joint stability condition such that the ﬁrms form both
cartels if and only if this condition is satisﬁed. Note that the right hand side (RHS) of
the above condition does not depend on the ﬁne reduction under Amnesty Plus since,
after a unilateral deviation, at most one cartel is left, and the Amnesty Plus option is
not available. The left hand side (LHS), however, is weakly increasing piecewise in R1
and R2 and thus, the joint stability condition becomes less stringent piecewise when
the ﬁne discounts increase. It is important to understand, that the eﬀects of Amnesty
Plus on cartel desistance and on cartel deterrence may go in opposite directions. On
the one hand, Amnesty Plus strengthens the ﬁrms’ incentives to report a cartel once the
other cartel has been detected. On the other hand, it may increase the expected present
discounted value of the joint cartel proﬁts as the expected ﬁne in case of a conviction
decreases. However, note that V12 is discontinuous in the ﬁne discounts.15 If R1 and
R2 increase up to the point where reporting under Amnesty Plus gets so attractive that
an individually stable cartel breaks down after the detection of the other cartel, V12
decreases drastically. However, if the ﬁne discounts then continue to increase, V12 rises
15This is the reason for the “piecewise”.
13again. This scenario may recur if the second cartel is also individually stable and breaks
down after the detection of the other cartel as the ﬁrms’ reporting incentives increase.
The net eﬀect of Amnesty Plus therefore depends on the strength of its eﬀect, ﬁrst, on
the ﬁrms’ reporting incentives and, second, on V12. It may thus be either pro- or anti-
competitive. We now examine this net eﬀect in each of the three possible constellations
of cartel formation under the EU antitrust policy.
4.1 No Cartel Formed Under the EU Policy: A Neutrality Result
Proposition 2 If both cartels are individually unstable, i.e. δ < e δ(q,θ1), Amnesty Plus
is neutral: the ﬁrms form no cartel both under the EU and the US policy.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition for the proof is as follows: Proceeding by backward induction, we take
the creation of both cartels as given and examine the Nash Equilibrium after the AA has
detected one of the cartels. Since both cartels are individually unstable, each ﬁrm has a
dominant strategy in reporting the remaining cartel after the ﬁrst detection. Thus, the
only Nash equilibrium in the remaining market is the ﬁrms’ simultaneous denunciation
of the cartel. Each ﬁrm may be ﬁrst to apply for amnesty, and thereby for Amnesty
Plus, with a 50% chance. Examining the joint stability condition, we ﬁnd that, for
any possible value of R−k, the expected present discounted value each ﬁrm gets when
forming both cartels is always smaller than the optimal unilateral deviation which takes
place in both markets. This signiﬁes that if no cartel is individually stable under the EU
Leniency Program, an ever so generous Amnesty Plus policy cannot have any stabilizing
eﬀect. As a consequence, Amnesty Plus is neutral in this case.
4.2 One Cartel Formed Under the EU Policy: An Anticompetitive
Eﬀect
In Lemma 1 we give the expression for the joint stability threshold which we then use
to formulate Proposition 3.
Lemma 1 If cartel 1 survives the detection of cartel 2, but cartel 2 does not
survive the detection of cartel 1, i.e. max
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, the two cartels are jointly stable if and only if
δ ≥
1














Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3 If cartel 1 is individually stable whereas cartel 2 is not, i.e. e δ(q,θ1) ≤










≤ δ < e δ(q,θ2)
This condition deﬁnes a non-empty range of values of δ if and only if
R2 <
(1 + qθ2)(π1 − qF1)







Amnesty Plus then encourages the ﬁrms to form the individually unstable cartel 2 which
they would not have formed under the EU policy.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3 suggests that Amnesty Plus may have an anticompetitive eﬀect by
stabilizing a cartel which would not have been sustainable under the EU Leniency Pro-
gram in the presence of another cartel which is individually stable. Note that for this
anticompetitive eﬀect to potentially occur, the ﬁrms must form cartel 1 but not cartel
2 under the EU policy for a non-empty range of discount factor values. For this to be
the case, the individual stability thresholds for markets 1 and 2 must diﬀer. However, if
the ﬁnes are proportional to the collusive proﬁts, i.e. θ1 = θ2, and/or if the markets are
perfectly symmetric, these thresholds are identical, and Amnesty Plus cannot have any
anticompetitive eﬀect.
We sketch the proof of Proposition 3 as follows: If the individually stable cartel 1
is detected, reporting the individually unstable cartel 2 is a dominant strategy for each
ﬁrm. Hence, the ﬁrms report cartel 2 and may save part of the ﬁne already imposed.
Amnesty Plus thus decreases a ﬁrm’s expected ﬁne from a cartel conviction such that, for
each ﬁrm, the joint creation of the cartels may result in an expected present discounted
15value of proﬁts larger than the sum of the individual expected present discounted cartel
proﬁts. The ﬁrms form both cartels if the payoﬀ from the optimal unilateral deviation,
which occurs in market 2 only, does not exceed the value of the joint creation of the
cartels. Two conditions have to hold. First, cartel 1 must be not only individually
stable but also robust to a detection of cartel 2. Hence, the robustness condition must
hold for a non-empty range of values for δ within the interval [e δ(q,θ1), e δ(q,θ2)[. This is
true if the robustness threshold for cartel 1 lies below the individual stability threshold







< e δ(q,θ2) ⇐⇒ R2 <
(1 + qθ2)(π1 − qF1)
(1 − q)(1 − qθ2)
(2)
Second, the cartels must be jointly stable. For the joint stability condition to hold for a
non-empty range of values for δ within the interval [e δ(q,θ1), e δ(q,θ2)[, it is necessary and
suﬃcient that the joint stability threshold lies below the individual stability threshold


















If the ﬁne discount in market 2 is low enough, cartel 1 survives the detection of
cartel 2 for all δ ∈ [e δ(q,θ1), e δ(q,θ2)[. If inequality (3) is satisﬁed, and the joint
stability condition holds, the ﬁrms form both cartels whereas, in the absence of
Amnesty Plus, they would have formed cartel 1 alone. Otherwise, the ﬁrms collude
only in market 1, and Amnesty Plus is neutral.
ii/
π1+qF1
1−q < R2 <
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2)
The formation of the two cartels is the best collusive equilibrium if and only if
both cartel 1 survives the detection of cartel 2 and the cartels are jointly stable. In
this case, Amnesty Plus has an anticompetitive eﬀect. However, if the robustness
condition for cartel 1 is not satisﬁed, the ﬁrms cannot sustain the remaining cartel
after one cartel detection, and the joint stability condition never holds. As a




In this case, the ﬁne discount under Amnesty Plus in market 2 is too high such
that the robustness condition for cartel 1 cannot be satisﬁed. Hence, no cartel
16survives the detection of the other cartel, and the joint stability condition does not
hold. The ﬁrms form only the individually stable cartel 1, and Amnesty Plus is
neutral.
Corollary 1 Amnesty Plus has no anticompetitive eﬀect on cartel formation if the ﬁne
discount a ﬁrm gets under Amnesty Plus for cartel −k does not exceed the ﬁne for the
reported cartel k, i.e. R−k ≤ Fk.
Proof. Note that if R1 ≤ F2 the condition R1 >
1+q
1−qF2 + 2π2
1−q does not hold, and the
joint stability condition cannot be satisﬁed for δ within the interval [e δ(q,θ1), e δ(q,θ2)[. It
follows from Proposition 3 that Amnesty Plus cannot have any anti-competitive eﬀect
in this case. Finally, R2 ≤ F1 is always true since F1 ≥ F2 ≥ R2.
Corollary 1 suggests that, as a simple rule to avoid any stabilizing eﬀect of the
Amnesty Plus policy, the size of the ﬁne discount granted in one market should not
exceed the ﬁne a non successful Amnesty Plus applicant would have incurred in the other
market. This rule is suﬃcient but not necessary. Intuitively, if R−k ≤ Fk, each ﬁrm gets
a negative expected payoﬀ from reporting cartel k after the detection of cartel −k. This
is because both ﬁrms report cartel k simultaneously and thus, with probability 1
2, each
ﬁrm has to pay a ﬁne which is higher than the possible ﬁne discount. The expected
present discounted value each ﬁrm gets from the joint formation of the cartels decreases
and cannot exceed the payoﬀ from the optimal unilateral deviation. Hence, if cartel 2 is
individually unstable such that the ﬁrms report it after the detection of cartel 1, the two
cartels can never be jointly stable. By keeping the ﬁne reduction low, the AA therefore
can avoid any anticompetitive eﬀect of the Amnesty Plus policy.16
4.3 Both Cartels Formed Under the EU Policy: A Pro-competitive
Eﬀect
Proposition 4 If both cartels are individually stable, i.e. δ ≥ e δ(q,θ2), Amnesty Plus
has a pro-competitive eﬀect on cartel formation if and only if at least one of the cartels
is not robust and the two cartels are not jointly stable. In particular:
16Consider the interaction of n ≥ 2 ﬁrms on markets 1 and 2. We suppose that, if all the ﬁrms
report a cartel simultaneously, each ﬁrm is ﬁrst with probability
1
n. As the ﬁrst ﬁrm reporting is the
only company eligible for the ﬁne discount under Amnesty Plus, a ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ from reporting




n Fk. We have
1
n[R−k − (n − 1)Fk] ≤ 0 if and only if
R−k ≤ (n − 1)Fk. It is then straightforward that if R−k ≤ (n − 1)Fk holds for n = 2, it holds a fortiori
for n > 2.
17i/ If R2 ≤
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2) , Amnesty Plus has a pro-competitive eﬀect for a non-empty
range of values of δ if and only if
π2+qF2
1−q < R1 <
2π2+(1+q)F2
1−q .
ii/ If R2 >
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2) , Amnesty Plus has a pro-competitive eﬀect for a non-empty
range of values of δ for any value of R1 ∈ ]0,F1].
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 4 suggests that Amnesty Plus may have a pro-competitive eﬀect by
destabilizing a cartel which would have been sustainable under the EU policy. The sketch
of the proof is as follows: Amnesty Plus decreases the expected present discounted value
of proﬁts each ﬁrm gets when forming both cartels if, following the detection of one
individually stable cartel, the ﬁrms report the other individually stable cartel to beneﬁt
from the ﬁne discount. V12 may then fall below the payoﬀ from the optimal unilateral
deviation which occurs in market 2 only. As a consequence, the ﬁrms would anticipate
that the cartels are not jointly stable and form only the more proﬁtable of the cartels.
To examine the exact circumstances under which the ﬁrms form both cartels, we need to
ﬁnd the expected discounted value each ﬁrm gets from the formation of both cartels and
compare it to the payoﬀ from the optimal deviation. Since both cartels are individually
stable, each cartel survives the detection of the other cartel if and only if the robustness
condition holds. Combining conditions (1) and (2), four possible situations arise:
i/ R1 ≤
π2+qF2
1−q and R2 ≤
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2)
The individual stability condition in market 2 is more stringent than the robustness
conditions for both cartels. Hence, each cartel survives the detection of the other
cartel for all δ ≥ e δ(q,θ2). Not surprisingly, the expected present discounted value
each ﬁrm gets from forming both cartels turns out to be always weakly greater
than the payoﬀ from the optimal unilateral deviation. As a consequence, the ﬁrms
form both cartels. Amnesty Plus is neutral because the ﬁrms form also both cartels
under the EU policy.
ii/ R1 >
π2+qF2
1−q and R2 ≤
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2)
The individual stability condition in market 1 is more stringent than the robustness
condition in this market. Cartel 1 therefore always survives the detection of cartel
2. Cartel 2 however survives the detection of cartel 1 only if it is robust. If
the robustness condition for cartel 2 is satisﬁed, the analysis is the same as in
i/. Hence, the payoﬀ from the optimal unilateral deviation does not exceed the
expected present discounted proﬁts from the joint creation of the cartels. The
18ﬁrms form both cartels, and Amnesty Plus is neutral. However, if cartel 2 is not
robust, the ﬁrms form both cartels if and only if the joint stability condition holds.
Amnesty Plus has a pro-competitive eﬀect in the case where this condition is not
satisﬁed. The ﬁrms form only cartel 1 in the US whereas they would have formed
both of them in the EU.
iii/ R1 ≤
π2+qF2
1−q and R2 >
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2)
Cartel 2 is individually stable and robust and therefore always survives the de-
tection of cartel 1. Cartel 1 however survives the detection of cartel 2 only if it
is robust. If the robustness condition for cartel 1 holds, then the analysis is the
same as in i/. The ﬁrms do not ﬁnd the optimal unilateral deviation proﬁtable
and create both cartels. If cartel 1 is not robust, the ﬁrms form both cartels if and
only if the joint stability condition holds. Otherwise, they form only cartel 1, and
Amnesty Plus has a pro-competitive eﬀect.
iv/ R1 >
π2+qF2
1−q and R2 >
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2)
Each cartel survives the detection of the other cartel only if it is robust. If both
cartels are robust, the ﬁrms form both cartels, and Amnesty Plus is neutral. If
either one or none of the robustness conditions holds, the ﬁrms form both cartels if
and only if the joint stability condition holds. In particular, if none of the cartels is
robust, the joint stability condition anyway holds for a non-empty set of discount
factor values if the conviction probability q is small enough. Otherwise, the ﬁrms
form only cartel 1, and Amnesty Plus has a pro-competitive eﬀect.
5 Discussion
We illustrate our main ﬁndings from sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 by means of Figures
1 to 4. Note in particular that Figures 1 and 2 depict the results only for the case
where F1 >
2π2+(1+q)F2
1−q . In Figure 1, we show the net eﬀect of Amnesty Plus on cartel
formation as a function of the ﬁne discount R1 for a given R2 ≤
π1+qF1
1−q such that cartel
1, whenever it is individually stable, always survives the detection of cartel 2. Amnesty
Plus is neutral for all values of δ if R1 is suﬃciently small, i.e. R1 ≤
π2+qF2
1−q . Amnesty
Plus has a pro-competitive eﬀect on cartel formation for intermediate values of R1, i.e.
π2+qF2
1−q < R1 <
2π2+(1+q)F2
1−q , and for values of δ such that both cartels are individually
but not jointly stable and such that cartel 2 is not robust to a detection of cartel 1.
This region is labeled with a “+”. The ﬁrms form only cartel 1 in the US whereas
they would have formed both cartels in the EU. As a measure of the size of the eﬀect,
19we use the width of the relevant interval of values for δ on the y-axis. Hence, we can
say that the pro-competitive eﬀect increases between
π2+qF2
1−q and R∗
1 where it ﬁnally
reaches its maximum. Beyond R∗




1 is determined by the intersection of the robustness threshold of cartel
2 and the joint stability threshold when cartel 1 is robust which both do not depend on
R2. As a consequence, the maximum size of the pro-competitive eﬀect of Amnesty Plus







− e δ(q,θ2) does not involve R2 neither. In the region
labeled with a “-”, Amnesty Plus has an anticompetitive eﬀect on cartel formation. This
eﬀect occurs for higher values of R1, i.e. R1 >
2π2+(1+q)F2
1−q , and for values of δ such that
cartel 1 is individually stable and robust whereas cartel 2 is not, and the two cartels
are jointly stable. The ﬁrms form both cartels in the US whereas, in the absence of
Amnesty Plus, they would have formed cartel 1 alone. The size of the anticompetitive
































Figure 1: Eﬀect of Amnesty Plus if R2 ≤
π1+qF1
1−q





(1−q)(1−qθ2) . The only diﬀerence with respect to Figure 1 is that the robustness
threshold for cartel 1 is now above its individual stability threshold. The region where
Amnesty Plus has an anticompetitive eﬀect may thus be truncated at the level of the
robustness threshold for cartel 1. Hence, the potential anticompetitive eﬀect of Amnesty






























Figure 2: Eﬀect of Amnesty Plus if
π1+qF1
1−q < R2 <
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2)
In Figure 3 and 4, we show the net eﬀect of Amnesty Plus for a given R2 ≥
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2) . From Proposition 3 we know that Amnesty Plus cannot have any an-
ticompetitive eﬀect in this case. Moreover, note that, in contrast to Figures 1 and 2,
Amnesty Plus has a pro-competitive eﬀect on cartel formation for a non-empty range
of values of δ for any value of R1 > 0. In Figure 3, the conviction probability q is very
small. In this case, the highest discount factor value for which the pro-competitive eﬀect
occurs is close to the individual stability threshold of cartel 2. Hence, the size of the
potential pro-competitive eﬀect is rather small. Note in particular that Amnesty Plus
cannot have any pro-competitive eﬀect if cartel 1 is robust to a detection of cartel 2.
The pro-competitive eﬀect only occurs if cartel 1 is not robust, and both cartels are
individually but not jointly stable. The interval of discount factor values where these
conditions jointly hold is never empty. The value of R∗
1 for which the pro-competitive
eﬀect is maximal corresponds to the intersection of the robustness threshold for cartel
2 and the joint stability threshold when both cartels are not robust. Note that, as the
latter depends on both R1 and R2, R∗





























Figure 3: Eﬀect of Amnesty Plus if R2 ≥
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2) and q is very small
Figure 4 displays the eﬀect of Amnesty Plus with q not “too small”. There are two
main diﬀerences with respect to Figure 3. First, the region where the pro-competitive
eﬀect of Amnesty Plus occurs is larger. Second, the pro-competitive eﬀect may appear
even if cartel 1 is robust to a detection of cartel 2. If this happens, the value of R∗
1 is at
the intersection of the robustness threshold for cartel 2 and the joint stability threshold
when cartel 1 is robust. R∗































Figure 4: Eﬀect of Amnesty Plus if R2 ≥
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2) and q is not too small
226 EC Leniency Program With Multimarket Trigger
Strategies
Suppose now that the ﬁrms try to sustain repeated collusion by consciously exploiting
their multimarket contact and using multimarket trigger strategies. Each ﬁrm cooperates
in market k = 1,2 as long as its partner does. If one ﬁrm unilaterally deviates from
the illegal agreement in one of the markets, the co-conspirator reacts with a reversion to
competition in both markets. As a deviation in one market triggers punishment not only
in the market where the deviation occurred but also in the market where the collusive
agreement has been respected, the optimal deviation always takes place in both markets
simultaneously. By linking the punishment across markets, ﬁrms can potentially transfer
slack enforcement power from market 1 to market 2 and sustain collusion in both markets
for values of δ for which only cartel 1 would have been sustainable under single-market
contact. We state the formal argument in the following proposition:17
Proposition 5 There exists a threshold e π2(q) < π1 such that:
a- If π2 < e π2(q), i.e. the asymmetry between markets 1 and 2 is suﬃciently strong, the
use of multimarket trigger strategies enhances the ﬁrms’ ability to collude relative
to the use of standard trigger strategies. In other words, there exists a threshold
¯ δ(q,θ1,θ2,λ) ∈]e δ(q,θ1), e δ(q,θ2)[ such that:
i/ If δ < e δ(q,θ1), no cartel is formed.
ii/ If e δ(q,θ1) ≤ δ < ¯ δ(q,θ1,θ2,λ), cartel 1 is formed whereas cartel 2 is not.
iii/ If ¯ δ(q,θ1,θ2,λ) ≤ δ, both cartels are formed.
b- If e π2(q) ≤ π2 ≤ π1, i.e. the asymmetry between markets 1 and 2 is suﬃciently
weak, the use of multimarket strategies does not aﬀect the ﬁrms’ ability to collude
relative to the use of standard trigger strategies.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In Bernheim and Whinston (1990), multimarket contact does not aﬀect collusive
behavior if the markets are identical. In our model, multimarket contact turns out to be
irrelevant not only for identical markets but also for markets which are not too diﬀerent
in terms of proﬁtability. This ﬁnding can be interpreted as a somewhat broader version
17In what follows we suppose that θk =
Fk
πk is strictly decreasing in πk. Otherwise, multimarket trigger
strategies cannot have any eﬀect on the ﬁrms’ ability to collude.
23of the irrelevance result of Bernheim and Whinston (1990), and it has a straightforward
explanation. In the presence of an antitrust policy, the ﬁrms’ may use multimarket
trigger strategies to sustain cooperation on both markets just as long as the AA does
not detect one of the cartels. However, if the AA detects one of the cartels, the ﬁrms
cannot use multimarket punishment thereafter, and they can sustain the remaining cartel
in subsequent periods only if this cartel is individually stable. Antitrust enforcement may
thus shorten the time period during which the ﬁrms use multimarket trigger strategies
and therefore, it may limit the eﬀect these strategies can have on the ease to sustain
cooperation on both markets.
Nonetheless, if markets 1 and 2 are suﬃciently asymmetric, the use of multimarket
trigger strategies does strengthen the ﬁrms’ ability to collude. In particular, the ﬁrms
form both cartels for a larger range of discount factor values.
7 US Amnesty Program With Multimarket Trigger Strate-
gies
Let us now examine whether the ﬁrms may inﬂuence the eﬀectiveness of the Amnesty
Plus policy by using multimarket trigger strategies. To do this, we need to know how
the use of multimarket strategies aﬀects the individual stability, robustness and joint
stability conditions.
Consider ﬁrst the individual stability and the robustness conditions: After the de-
tection of a cartel in one market, the ﬁrms interact only in the one remaining market.
Since, without multimarket contact, the ﬁrms cannot link punishment across markets,
they have to use standard trigger strategies to sustain the remaining cartel. The individ-
ual stability and the robustness conditions as well as the resulting thresholds therefore
are the same as in section 4.
Second, consider the joint stability condition: The use of multimarket trigger strate-
gies may alter the optimal unilateral deviation and thereby aﬀect the joint stability
condition. This is because the optimal unilateral deviation occurs always in the two
markets with multimarket trigger strategies whereas, with standard trigger strategies,
a ﬁrm may ﬁnd it optimal to deviate in one market only. More precisely, if cartel 1
is individually unstable, i.e. δ < e δ(q,θ1), we have shown that the optimal unilateral
deviation under both strategies is to deviate in both markets. Hence, the use of multi-
market strategies does not aﬀect the joint stability condition and thereby the neutrality
of Amnesty Plus. However, if cartel 1 is individually sustainable, i.e. δ ≥ e δ(q,θ1), we
24have shown that the optimal unilateral deviation occurs only in market 2 when the ﬁrms
use standard trigger strategies but takes place in both markets when they use multi-
market trigger strategies. The joint stability condition V12 ≥ V1 + 2π2 when trigger
strategies are standard becomes V12 ≥ 2π1 + 2π2 when strategies link markets. Since
V1 ≥ 2π1 whenever δ ≥ e δ(q,θ1), the use of multimarket strategies makes the joint sta-
bility condition less stringent. Hence, the ﬁrms form both cartels for a larger range of
discount factor values if they use multimarket rather than standard trigger strategies.
In particular, for values of δ such that 2π1 + 2π2 ≤ V12 < V1 + 2π2 the ﬁrms form both
cartels when they use multimarket strategies whereas they would have formed only cartel
1 with standard trigger strategies.
From Proposition 5 we know that, if the markets 1 and 2 are suﬃciently similar in
terms of proﬁtability, multimarket trigger strategies do not aﬀect the set of discount
factor values for which the ﬁrms create only one, respectively, two cartels. However,
since the use of multimarket trigger strategies may lower the joint stability threshold,
the ﬁrms may anyway want to use these strategies to strengthen the anticompetitive
eﬀect of Amnesty Plus and to weaken its pro-competitive eﬀect. If the asymmetry
between the markets is strong enough, the use of multimarket strategies enlarges the
region of discount factor values for which the ﬁrms form both cartels. Hence, the pro-
competitive eﬀect of Amnesty Plus may occur for a larger range of discount factor values.
At the same time, however, the use of multimarket strategies makes the joint stability
condition less stringent and thereby the anticompetitive eﬀect of Amnesty Plus more
likely to occur. Similarly, the set of discount factor values for which the ﬁrms form
only cartel 1 and for which Amnesty Plus may have an anticompetitive eﬀect shrinks
with the use of multimarket trigger strategies. However, the joint stability condition
becomes less stringent, and the occurrence of the anticompetitive eﬀect more likely. As
a consequence, if the markets diﬀer suﬃciently in terms of proﬁtability, the net eﬀect of
the multimarket trigger strategies is ambiguous.
8 Conclusion
This paper examines the eﬀect of the Amnesty Plus policy on the ﬁrms’ incentives to
engage in cartel activities. We develop an inﬁnitely repeated interaction framework to
highlight the mechanism through which Amnesty Plus encourages, discourages or has no
eﬀect on cartel formation when ﬁrms use standard and multimarket trigger strategies.
US success stories suggest that Amnesty Plus weakens cartel stability. Our analysis
shows that this intuition is not always correct.
25We ﬁnd that Amnesty Plus may have an anticompetitive eﬀect by stabilizing a cartel
which is individually unstable in the presence of another cartel which is individually
stable. If the latter cartel is detected, the ﬁrms report the former in the hope of a
discount in the ﬁne already imposed. Hence, Amnesty Plus decreases a ﬁrm’s expected
ﬁne from a cartel conviction such that, for each ﬁrm, the joint creation of the cartels
may result in an expected discounted value of proﬁts larger than the payoﬀ from the
optimal unilateral deviation. The ﬁrms would anticipate that the cartels are jointly
stable and form both cartels whereas only one of them would have been created under
the EU Leniency Program.
Our results also show that, Amnesty Plus may have a pro-competitive eﬀect by
destabilizing a cartel which is individually stable. Amnesty Plus decreases the expected
present discounted value of proﬁts each ﬁrm gets when forming both cartels if, following
the detection of one individually stable cartel, the ﬁrms report the other individually
stable cartel to beneﬁt from the ﬁne discount. The value of the joint creation may then
fall below the payoﬀ from the optimal unilateral deviation. The ﬁrms anticipate that the
cartels are not jointly stable and form only the more proﬁtable of the cartels whereas
they would have formed both cartels under the EU policy.
We have also examined whether the ﬁrms can exploit their multimarket contact
by linking punishment across markets. Amnesty Plus is implemented by the antitrust
authority and inherently links the markets. We ﬁnd that if the markets do not diﬀer
substantially in terms of proﬁtability, the use of multimarket trigger strategies can partly
oﬀset the destabilizing eﬀect of Amnesty Plus whereas it does not directly aﬀect the ﬁrms’
ability to collude. Firms may thus want to adopt multimarket trigger strategies even if
their use does not directly facilitate collusion.
Our ﬁndings suggest that an antitrust policy with Amnesty Plus may help to increase
cartel deterrence insofar as its potential anticompetitive eﬀect could be avoided. We have
shown that, by setting the size of the ﬁne discount granted in one market such that it
does not exceed the ﬁne a non successful Amnesty Plus applicant would have incurred in
the other market, the antitrust authority can avoid any stabilizing eﬀect of this policy.
In view of this result, we believe that, for future research, it might be particularly fruitful
to elaborate on a thorough normative analysis of how an optimal Amnesty Plus policy
should be designed.
26A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Note ﬁrst that if the ﬁrms create both cartels at the
beginning of a period, the probability that the AA detects both cartels during this
period is q2, that it detects cartel 1 (cartel 2) whereas it does not detect cartel 2 (cartel
1) is q(1 − q), and that it detects none of the cartels is (1 − q)2. These probabilities
follow directly from the independence assumption on the AA’s detection technology.
i/ Assume that δ < e δ(q,θ1). In this case, both cartels are individually unstable. The
ﬁrms know that, regardless of their reporting decisions right after the detection of
one cartel, they will not be able to sustain the remaining cartel in the following
period. Hence, there are two possible Nash Equilibria at the end of a period where
the AA detects only one of the cartels: either both ﬁrms report the remaining cartel
k where each ﬁrm gets an expected payoﬀ of −1
2Fk or both ﬁrms do not report
cartel k where each ﬁrm gets a payoﬀ of 0. Since we are looking for the best collusive
subgame-perfect equilibrium, we focus on the Pareto superior equilibrium where
the ﬁrms do not report the remaining cartel. The expected present discounted
value each ﬁrm gets from the creation of both cartels is
V12 = q2(π1 + π2 − F1 − F2) + q(1 − q)(π1 + π2 − F1)
+ q(1 − q)(π1 + π2 − F2) + (1 − q)2(π1 + π2 + δV12)
which we rewrite as
V12 =
π1 − qF1









Since V1 < 2π1 and V2 < 2π2, the optimal unilateral deviation occurs in both
markets. The two cartels are then jointly stable if and only if
V12 ≥ 2π1 + 2π2
From expression (A-1), it follows that V12 ≤ V1 + V2 < 2π1 + 2π2. Hence, the
optimal unilateral deviation results in a higher payoﬀ than the expected present
discounted value each ﬁrm gets when forming both cartels. As a consequence, the
two cartels are not jointly stable, and the ﬁrms do not form both cartels. Since
V1 < 2π1 and V2 < 2π2, the ﬁrms do neither form one cartel alone and thus, they
form no cartel at all.
27ii/ Assume that e δ(q,θ1) ≤ δ < e δ(q,θ2). In this case, if the ﬁrms form both cartels but
the AA detects cartel 2, then, if cartel 1 is not reported, the ﬁrms will again form
cartel 1 in the next period. However, if the AA detects cartel 1, the ﬁrms will not
form cartel 2 in the next period. According to the Pareto dominance argument
stated in i/, if one cartel is discovered, the ﬁrms do not report the remaining cartel
in the absence of Amnesty Plus. Hence, the expected present discounted value
each ﬁrm gets from the creation of both cartels is
V12 = q2(π1 + π2 − F1 − F2) + q(1 − q)(π1 + π2 − F1)
+ q(1 − q)(π1 + π2 − F2 + δV1) + (1 − q)2(π1 + π2 + δV12)
which we rewrite as
V12 =
π1 − qF1
1 − δ(1 − q)
+
π2 − qF2
1 − δ(1 − q)2 = V1 +
π2 − qF2




Since V1 ≥ 2π1 and V2 < 2π2, the optimal unilateral deviation is to deviate in
market 2 only. This deviation results in a payoﬀ of V1 +2π2 which is greater than
V12. Hence, the two cartels are not jointly stable, and the ﬁrms therefore do not
form both cartels. However, since cartel 1 is individually stable whereas cartel 2
is not, it is a Nash Equilibrium to form cartel 1 alone but not to form cartel 2
without cartel 1.
iii/ Assume that e δ(q,θ2) < δ. In this case, if the ﬁrms form both cartels but the AA
detects one of them, they will again form the remaining cartel in the next period.
Hence, the expected present discounted value each ﬁrm gets from the creation of
both cartels is
V12 = q2(π1 + π2 − F1 − F2) + q(1 − q)(π1 + π2 − F1 + δV2)
+ q(1 − q)(π1 + π2 − F2 + δV1) + (1 − q)2(π1 + π2 + δV12)
which we rewrite as
V12 =
π1 − qF1
1 − δ(1 − q)
+
π2 − qF2
1 − δ(1 − q)
= V1 + V2 (A-3)
The optimal deviation occurs in market 2 only (see step 1 in Proof of Proposition
4) which results in a payoﬀ of V1 + 2π2. Since V2 ≥ 2π2 this payoﬀ is weakly
28smaller than V12. Hence, the creation of the two cartels is a Nash Equilibrium.
Since Vk > 0 which implies that V12 > V1 and V12 > V2, the payoﬀ from the joint
creation of the cartels is higher than the payoﬀs from both the Nash Equilibrium
where the ﬁrms form only cartel 1 and the Nash Equilibrium where the ﬁrms form
only cartel 2. As a consequence, the ﬁrms form both cartels.
Proof of Proposition 2. We proceed in 3 steps. In step 1, we show that the optimal
unilateral deviation occurs in both markets. In step 2, we determine the expected present
discounted value V12 a ﬁrm gets from the creation of the two cartels. We then show in
step 3 that the joint stability condition can never be satisﬁed for any value of δ.
Step 1. Since both cartels are individually unstable we know that V1 < 2π1 and
V2 < 2π2. Hence, it must be true that 2π1 + 2π2 > V1 + 2π2 and 2π1 + 2π2 > 2π1 + V2.
The optimal unilateral deviation therefore takes place in both markets.
Step 2. After the detection of one cartel, reporting the remaining cartel is a dominant
strategy for each ﬁrm. This equilibrium strategy gives each ﬁrm an expected payoﬀ of
1
2R1 − 1
2F2 after the detection of cartel 1 and 1
2R2 − 1
2F1 after the detection of cartel 2.
The expected present discounted value V12 is then













F1) + (1 − q)2(π1 + π2 + δV12)
which we rewrite as
V12 =
π1 + π2 − q(F1 + F2)







1 − δ(1 − q)2
(F1 + F2 − R1 − R2) (A-4)
Step 3. For the two cartels to be jointly stable, it is necessary and suﬃcient that the
payoﬀ from the optimal unilateral deviation does not exceed V12, that is
V12 ≥ 2π1 + 2π2
From equation (A-4), we know that V12 ≤ V1 + V2 and as both cartels are individually
unstable, we have V1 + V2 < 2π1 + 2π2. Hence, the joint stability condition never
holds, and the ﬁrms do not form these cartels together. Moreover, since V1 < 2π1 and
V2 < 2π2, the ﬁrms neither form one cartel alone.
29Proof of Lemma 1. We ﬁrst show that the optimal unilateral deviation takes place
only in market 2 (step 1). We then determine the expected present discounted value V12
each ﬁrm gets when forming both cartels (step 2) and derive the joint stability condition
from which we easily get the joint stability threshold (step 3).
Step 1. Since cartel 1 is individually stable whereas cartel 2 is not, we have V1 ≥ 2π1
and V2 < 2π2. It follows from these two inequalities that V1+2π2 ≥ 2π1+2π2 > V2+2π1.
The optimal unilateral deviation therefore occurs in market 2 only.
Step 2. After the detection of the individually stable cartel 1, it is a dominant
strategy for each ﬁrm to report the individually unstable cartel 2. The expected present
discounted value V12 is:







+q(1 − q)(π1 + π2 − F2 + δV1) + (1 − q)2(π1 + π2 + δV12)
We rewrite this expression as
V12 = V1 +
π2 − qF2




1 − δ(1 − q)2
(R1 − F2) (A-5)
Step 3. The formation of both cartels constitutes a Nash Equilibrium if a ﬁrm has
no incentive to unilaterally deviate from the collusive agreements in both markets. For
the two cartels to be jointly stable it is thus necessary and suﬃcient that V12 ≥ V1+2π2.
As V12 ≥ V1, the joint stability condition also implies that whenever the formation of
both cartels is a Nash Equilibrium, it leads to higher proﬁts than the Nash Equilibrium
where the ﬁrms form cartel 1 only. Rewritten on δ the joint stability condition becomes
δ ≥
1














The formation of both cartels is a the best collusive equilibrium if and only if
















, cartel 1 survives a detection of cartel 2 for all δ ∈
[e δ(q,θ1), e δ(q,θ2)[. The expected present discounted value V12 each ﬁrm gets from
the creation of both cartels is given in equation (A-5). The formation of both








1−q < R2 <
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2)





< e δ(q,θ2), cartel 1 survives a detection of cartel 2 if











for V12 is the same as in equation (A-4). Since V12 ≤ V1 + V2 < V1 + 2π2, the
payoﬀ from the optimal unilateral deviation is always strictly higher than the
expected present discounted value, and the formation of both cartels is not a





the expression for V12 is given in
equation (A-5), and the formation of both cartels is the best collusive equilibrium














. Cartel 1 does never
survive a detection of cartel 2 for any value of δ ∈ [e δ(q,θ1), e δ(q,θ2)[, and the
expression for V12 is given in equation (A-4). Since V12 ≤ V1 + V2 < V1 + 2π2, the
formation of both cartels is not a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4. We proceed in 2 steps. In step 1, we show that the optimal
unilateral deviation takes place only in market 2. In step 2, we determine the exact
circumstances under which the pro-competitive eﬀect of Amnesty Plus occurs.
Step 1. Since both cartels are individually stable, we have V1 ≥ 2π1 and V2 ≥ 2π2.
It follows that V2 + 2π1 ≥ 2π1 + 2π2, and it is thus suﬃcient to show that
V1 + 2π2 ≥ V2 + 2π1
31which is the same as
V1 − 2π1 ≥ V2 − 2π2 ⇐⇒ π1

1 − qθ1






1 − δ(1 − q)
− 2

The above inequality holds because π1 ≥ π2, θ1 ≤ θ2 and the expressions in the brackets
are positive. The optimal unilateral deviation therefore takes place only in market 2 and




1−q and R2 ≤
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2)










, each cartel survives the
detection of the other cartel for all δ ≥ e δ(q,θ2). Thus, the expected present
discounted value V12 each ﬁrm gets when forming both cartels is:
V12 = q2(π1 + π2 − F1 − F2) + q(1 − q)(π1 + π2 − F1 + δV2)
+q(1 − q)(π1 + π2 − F2 + δV1) + (1 − q)2(π1 + π2 + δV12)
We can rewrite this expression as
V12 =
π1 − qF1
1 − δ(1 − q)
+
π2 − qF2
1 − δ(1 − q)
= V1 + V2
Since V2 ≥ 2π2, the payoﬀ from the unilateral optimal deviation does not exceed
V12, and the formation of both cartels is the best collusive equilibrium. The ﬁrms
create both cartels, and Amnesty Plus is neutral.
ii/ R1 >
π2+qF2
1−q and R2 ≤
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2)
Cartel 1 survives the detection of cartel 2 for all δ ≥ e δ(q,θ2) whereas cartel 2











the analysis is the same as in i/ and leads to the result that the ﬁrms form both






expression for V12 is given in equation (A-5). The ﬁrms form both cartels only if





. From Proposition 3,
























for all δ ∈
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whereas they form only cartel 1 if δ ∈






. In the latter
case, Amnesty Plus has a pro-competitive eﬀect on cartel formation.
iii/ R1 ≤
π2+qF2
1−q and R2 >
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2)
Cartel 2 survives the detection of cartel 1 for all δ ≥ e δ(q,θ2), whereas cartel 1











the analysis is the same as in i/ and leads to the result that the ﬁrms form both





. For this range
of discount factor values, we derive the expression for V12 from equation (A-5) by
swapping 1 and 2, that is
V12 = V2 +
π1 − qF1




1 − δ(1 − q)2
(R2 − F1) (A-6)
The formation of both cartels is the best collusive equilibrium if and only if the
cartels are jointly stable. This is equivalent to

π1 − qF1
1 − δ(1 − q)2 −
π1 − qF1




















Note that inequality (A-7) does not depend on R1. Let us show that the set of val-
ues δ ∈






which satisﬁes inequality (A-7) is not empty if the











This expression is strictly positive since R2 >
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2) > π1. Hence, we can






(A-7) holds. Moreover, we can say that the set of values δ ∈






which does not satisfy condition (A-7) is never empty whatever the value of q > 0.
This is so because inequality (A-7) does not hold for δ = e δ(q,θ2) and thus, due
to the continuity of the LHS of (A-7) with respect to δ, it does not hold for δ
suﬃciently close to e δ(q,θ2). Therefore, the set over which Amnesty Plus has a
pro-competitive eﬀect within the interval









1−q and R2 >
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2)























the ﬁrms form both cartels, and Amnesty Plus










we get V12 from equation (A-5),
























the expression for V12 is given in (A-4), and the
ﬁrms form both cartels if and only if the joint stability condition holds, that is

π1 − qF1
1 − δ(1 − q)2 −
π1 − qF1














2(1 − δ(1 − q)2)































, the terms D and F go to 0 as q →








 −2π2 which is strictly positive
since R2 >
(1+qθ2)(π1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2) > π1 and R1 >
π2+qF2
1−q > π2. Therefore, for q suﬃciently



























34which does not satisfy condition (A-8) is never empty for any value of q > 0. This
is because condition (A-8) does not hold for δ = e δ(q,θ2) and, due to the continuity
of its LHS with respect to δ, it does not hold for δ suﬃciently close to e δ(q,θ2).
















Proof of Proposition 5. Note ﬁrst that when ﬁrms use multimarket strategies, the
optimal unilateral deviation is to deviate in both markets since punishment occurs in
both markets. A ﬁrm’s payoﬀ from such an optimal deviation is 2π1 + 2π2.
i/ Assume that δ < e δ(q,θ1). From the analysis of the EU antitrust policy when ﬁrms
use standard trigger strategies and, especially, from the proof of Proposition 1,
we know that the expected present discounted value V12 each ﬁrm gets from the
creation of both cartels is equal to expression (A-1):
V12 =
π1 − qF1





1 − δ(1 − q)2
| {z }
<V2
≤ V1 + V2 < 2π1 + 2π2
A unilateral deviation in both markets is therefore always proﬁtable, and the two
cartels are not jointly stable. Hence, the ﬁrms do not form both cartels. Moreover,
since V1 < 2π1 and V2 < 2π2, they do not form only one of the cartels either.
ii/ Assume that e δ(q,θ1) ≤ δ < e δ(q,θ2). From (A-2) we get the expression for V12
which is:
V12 = V1 +
π2 − qF2
1 − δ(1 − q)2
| {z }
≤V2<2π2
Since cartel 1 is individually stable whereas cartel 2 is not, it is a Nash Equilibrium
to form cartel 1 alone, whereas it is not a Nash Equilibrium to form cartel 2
without cartel 1. The formation of both cartels is the best collusive equilibrium
if and only if V12 ≥ 2π1 + 2π2. Note that this condition is less stringent than
its counterpart when ﬁrms use standard trigger strategies, i.e. V12 ≥ V1 + 2π2.
The joint stability condition is therefore more easily satisﬁed with multimarket
strategies which supports the intuition that multimarket contact is basically pro-
collusive. We provide, however, a more detailed analysis of this argument: Note
35that, since V12 is increasing in δ over [e δ(q,θ1), e δ(q,θ2)[, a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the inequality V12 ≥ 2π1 + 2π2 to hold over a non-empty range of




> 2π1 + 2π2. After some




















1 − qθ2 + q(1 + qθ2)

1 − q2θ2






We show that term A is increasing in θ2 over [θ1, 1
q − 2] by diﬀerentiating it with
respect to θ2. Since θ2 =
F(π2)
π2 is decreasing in π2, term A is also decreasing in π2
over [0,π1]. Term B, which is the same as 1
λ, is clearly decreasing in π2. Then, the
LHS of inequality (A-9) which is the multiplication of terms A and B is decreasing
in π2 over [0,π1]. Moreover, it is continuous in π2, goes to +∞ as π2 −→ 0 and
takes the value 0 for π2 = π−
1 . Using the intermediate value theorem, we can say
that there exists a threshold e π2(q) such that inequality (A-9) is satisﬁed if and
only if π2 < e π2(q). Hence, we distinguish two subcases:
– If π2 < e π2(q) then V12 > 2π1 +2π2 for δ = e δ(q,θ2)−, whereas V12 < 2π1 +2π2
for δ = e δ(q,θ1). Since V12 is continuous and increasing in δ, we can again
use the intermediate value theorem to conclude that there exists a threshold
¯ δ(q,θ1,θ2,λ) = ¯ δ such that V12 < 2π1 + 2π2 for δ ∈ [e δ(q,θ1), ¯ δ[ and V12 ≥
2π1 +2π2 for δ ∈ [¯ δ, e δ(q,θ2)[. Hence, the formation of both cartels is the best
collusive equilibrium for δ ∈ [¯ δ, e δ(q,θ2)[ but not for δ ∈ [e δ(q,θ1), ¯ δ[.
– If π2 ≥ e π2(q) then V12 ≤ 2π1 + 2π2 for δ = e δ(q,θ2)−. It follows that the
inequality V12 < 2π1+2π2 holds for all δ ∈ [e δ(q,θ1), e δ(q,θ2)[ which implies that
forming both cartels is never a Nash Equilibrium for δ ∈ [e δ(q,θ1), e δ(q,θ2)[.




1 − δ(1 − q)
+
π2 − qF2
1 − δ(1 − q)
= V1 + V2 ≥ 2π1 + 2π2
From the above inequality, it is straightforward that the formation of both cartels
is the best collusive equilibrium for all δ > e δ(q,θ2).
B Extensions
B.1 Relaxation of the Assumption θ2 ≥ θ1
Suppose now that the opposite assumption θ1 > θ2 holds. The direct implication, albeit
somewhat counterintuitive, is that cartel 2 is easier to sustain than the more proﬁtable
cartel 1, i.e. e δ(q,θ2) < e δ(q,θ1).
It is straightforward that Proposition 1 remains valid, provided that we reverse the
subscripts 1 and 2. Hence, under the EU antitrust policy, the ﬁrms form a cartel if and
only if it is individually stable.
Proposition 2 remains true, but we have to substitute e δ(q,θ2) for e δ(q,θ1), or more
generally, if we do not make any assumption on the size of θ1 relative to θ2, we substitute
min

e δ(q,θ1), e δ(q,θ2)

for e δ(q,θ1). Hence, if no cartel is individually stable, the ﬁrms
do not form any of the cartels under the US antitrust policy, and Amnesty Plus is still
neutral.
It is easy to show that by reversing the subscripts 1 and 2, the ﬁrst part of Proposition
3 still holds. However, whereas the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for Amnesty Plus
to have an anticompetitive eﬀect which we provide in the second part of Proposition
3 may be satisﬁed under the initial assumption θ2 ≥ θ1, the reverse is not true. One
of the new conditions deﬁning a non-empty range of values of δ for which Amnesty
Plus has an anticompetitive eﬀect would be R2 >
1+q
1−qF1 + 2π1
1−q. Hence, since we have
R2 ≤ F2 ≤ F1 <
1+q
1−qF1 + 2π1
1−q, the latter condition cannot be satisﬁed, and the potential
anticompetitive eﬀect of Amnesty Plus cannot occur.
Proposition 4 remains valid, although we have to substitute e δ(q,θ1) for e δ(q,θ2). More
generally, if we do not want to make any particular assumption on the relative size of
θ1 and θ2, we substitute max

e δ(q,θ1), e δ(q,θ2)

for e δ(q,θ2). Hence, Amnesty Plus may
still have a pro-competitive eﬀect on cartel formation.
37B.2 Unrestricted Strategy Choice
We relax the assumption that the ﬁrms can form a cartel in a period t > 0 only if
this cartel has been formed in the previous period. The key diﬀerence with respect
to our initial time structure is that, if the ﬁrms form only one cartel in some period,
and the AA detects this cartel during this period, they still have to possibility to form
the other cartel in the following period. More precisely, we modify the timing within a
period t ≥ 1 as follows: If no cartel has been convicted in the previous period, the time
structure of the latter applies to the current period. If both cartels have been formed
and convicted in the previous period, the ﬁrms compete in both markets. If either one
cartel has been formed and not convicted or both cartels have been formed and only one
has been convicted, the timing is the same as the one presented in stages 0 to 3 of our
initial set-up.
The modiﬁcation of the time structure does not aﬀect our results under the EC Le-
niency Program. In particular, Proposition 1 remains valid. Neither does the modiﬁca-
tion aﬀect the results under the US Amnesty Program with Amnesty Plus for δ < e δ(q,θ1)
and e δ(q,θ1) ≤ δ < e δ(q,θ2). Both the neutrality of Amnesty Plus result in Proposition 2
and the result on the potential anticompetitive eﬀect of Amnesty Plus stated in Propo-
sition 3 still hold.
Allowing for an unrestricted strategy choice, however, alters our results in the region
where Amnesty Plus may have a pro-competitive eﬀect, i.e. for δ ≥ e δ(q,θ2). The fact
that the ﬁrms may now start forming a cartel in a period t ≥ 1 gives rise to a new
equilibrium where they form cartel 1 until it is detected and then form cartel 2. This
is an equilibrium because for δ ≥ e δ(q,θ2), both cartels are individually stable. Amnesty
Plus cannot prevent such an outcome. Each ﬁrm gets an expected payoﬀ V 2
1 such that
V 2
1 = q(π1 − F1 + δV2) + (1 − q)(π1 + δV 2
1 )
The AA detects cartel 1 with probability q in which case the ﬁrms form cartel 2 in the
following period. With probability (1−q) the AA does not detect cartel 1, and the ﬁrms
form it again in the following period. Solving the above equation for V 2
1 we get
V 2
1 = V1 + q
δ
1 − δ(1 − q)
V2
For the joint formation of both cartels to be the most proﬁtable equilibrium, two con-
ditions must hold: First, V12 ≥ V1 + 2π2, i.e. the optimal unilateral deviation must not
be proﬁtable, second, V12 ≥ V 2
1 , i.e. the equilibrium where the ﬁrms form both cartels
38must be more proﬁtable than the equilibrium where the ﬁrms form ﬁrst cartel 1 and
then only, if detected, cartel 2. We can combine these two conditions as follows:
V12 ≥ max(V1 + 2π2,V 2
1 ) = max

V1 + 2π2,V1 + q
δ
1 − δ(1 − q)
V2

It is straightforward that the above condition is weakly more stringent than the condition
V12 ≥ V1 + 2π2. Moreover, it is strictly more stringent than the latter for at least some
values of the parameters δ and q. This is because q δ











= +∞. Hence, for small values of q the expression
q δ
1−δ(1−q)V2 can be greater than 2π2 for values of δ suﬃciently close to 1.
We have shown that allowing for an unrestricted strategy choice does not aﬀect the
potential anticompetitive eﬀect of Amnesty Plus but has an ambiguous impact on its
pro-competitive eﬀect. On the one hand, the region where the pro-competitive eﬀect
occurs may be larger because it may be more diﬃcult to achieve the joint stability of the
cartels. On the other hand, since Amnesty Plus can only deter the formation of cartel
2 as long as cartel 1 goes undetected, the pro-competitive eﬀect of Amnesty Plus, if it
occurs, is weaker relative to our previous ﬁndings.
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